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Configurations of corruption: A cross-national qualitative 
comparative analysis of levels of perceived corruption  
Abstract 
This article advances our understanding of the potential causes of national levels of 
corruption. It develops a new institutionalist criminological theoretical framework. It 
then applies fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to a sample of 77 
countries. The outcome is perceived corruption. Potentially causal conditions are levels 
of democracy, human development, income inequality and two value orientations: 
traditional/rational-secular and survival/self-expression. The analysis supports the 
new institutionalist expectation that the effects of each of these conditions are 
configurational and dependent upon the presence or absence of other conditions, 
including value orientations. This can help to explain why previous findings on the 
independent effect of democracy on corruption have been mixed. It may also help to 
explain why corruption is such an intractable phenomenon in many countries. 
 
Keywords 
Corruption, QCA, comparison, criminology, democracy, values, development, inequality 
 Introduction 
 
Corruption is a complex and apparently intractable phenomenon in countries around 
the world (Cole, 2015; UNODC, 2012). Despite advances in human development and 
democratization, the citizens of many countries have reported increasing concern 
regarding corruption (Hardoon and Heinrich, 2013). Does this mean that becoming 
more democratic or more developed is not enough to achieve low levels of corruption? 
These levels appear to vary widely between countries (Lambsdorff, 2007), which 
enables the study of the conditions that may cause this variation.  
 
While previous research consistently suggests that corruption tends to be lower in 
countries with higher levels of human development (de Graaf et al., 2010), the literature 
on the link with democracy is mixed. La Porta et al. (1999) found a statistically 
significant linear association between low levels of democracy and high levels of 
perceived corruption, while Ades and Di Tella (1999) found an association between 
lower levels of democracy and lower perceived corruption. One of the most highly cited 
articles that specifically addresses the causes of corruption (Treisman, 2000) did not 
find a link between contemporary levels of democracy and perceived corruption. Other 
studies found a non-linear relationship between democracy and corruption (Bäck and 
Hadenius, 2008; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Rock, 2009; Sung, 2004), suggesting 
that corruption is highest in countries with medium levels of democracy. Some 
researchers suggest that it is important to examine the role of values in the causes of 
corruption (Bussmann, 2015; Karstedt, 2004; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; Yeganeh, 2014). 
The influences of these potential causes are likely to be affected by socio-economic 
contexts, including income inequality (Akbar and Vujić, 2014; de Graaf et al., 2010; 
Uslaner, 2006; You and Khagram, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009).  
 
This article uses a new approach, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, 
Ragin, 2000, 2008), which has not been previously applied to the study of corruption. 
This analysis is used to assess a theoretical framework that builds on the “new 
institutionalist” approach in criminology (Karstedt, 2010). It examines the interplay of 
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institutions and values with socio-economic contexts. This analysis uses data for a 
sample of 77 countries from Transparency International’s (2015) Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) for 2014, alongside data for theoretically relevant social 
conditions including countries’ levels of formal democracy, value orientations 
(traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression), human development and 
income inequality.  It follows the recommendations of Schneider and Wagemann (2010) 
on good practice in carrying out and presenting QCA. Therefore, it discusses the 
application of the fsQCA findings to particular cases and types of cases. It also discusses 
limitations of the analysis before concluding with a summary of its main findings. The 
aim is to contribute to the collective task of answering the question: why do some 
countries have high levels of corruption, while others have low levels? 
New institutionalism in the comparative criminology of corruption 
 
A focus on the configurational interplay of political institutions and socially shared 
values is a defining feature of “new” institutionalism (March and Olsen, 2006; Nee and 
Ingrams, 1998). However, the tradition of institutionalist analysis in comparative, 
sociological criminology dates back at least to 1902, when Durkheim drew the link 
between the level of homicide in a country and its general orientation towards 
collectivist values (Durkheim, 2003 (1902); Eisner, 2012).  Durkheim’s approach to the 
impact of such values was already configurational. He argued that the effects of value 
and political institutions are contingent upon each other and on the country’s level of 
social development (DiCristina, 2004). Durkheim thereby anticipated the arguments of 
new institutionalist sociologists, who also emphasise the mutually interdependent 
effects of formally and informally instituted rules and procedures in varying socio-
economic contexts (Powell, 2007; Scott, 2001).  
 
Criminological institutionalism subsequently took several forms (e.g., Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Rusche and Kircheimer, 1939), although not always under the 
institutionalist label (Karstedt, 2010).  Karstedt noted a revived interest in new 
institutionalism in criminology which echoes the emphasis of Durkheim and of the neo-
institutionalist thinking in sociology, political science and economics on the role of 
values in social action (Lambsdorff et al., 2005; Nee and Ingrams, 1998). Institutions are 
defined as “the established aspects of society” (Scott and Marshall, 2009: 358). 
According to Karstedt (2010: 355), “new institutionalist approaches conceptualize 
crime and justice as institutional outcomes of specific arrangements and clusters of 
institutions that exist in society.” Karstedt drew on North’s (1990) conceptualization of 
institutions as the “rules of the game.” New institutionalists argue that explanations of 
human behavior must take into account culturally shared norms as well as formal 
economic and political institutions (Koelble, 1995; Nee and Ingrams, 1998). Formal 
institutions include governments, courts, laws and corporations. But new 
institutionalism also “acknowledg[es] the role of norms, morality and fairness” 
(Karstedt, 2010: 340). Such “strong, semi-permanent, underlying” normative 
dispositions (Scott and Marshall, 2009: 788) are socially shared value orientations. They 
influence social action and are also influenced by the social environment (Van Deth, 
1995). The values that individuals hold tend to be learned from the general orientations 
that are commonly held in their society. Thus, value orientations play an important role 
– alongside formal institutions and socio-economic conditions – in producing patterns 
of social action (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Karstedt, 
2010, 2015a), although these authors place different emphases on each of these three 
sets of causal conditions.  
 
The formal institutions that are most likely to be involved in the causes of corruption 
include the institutions of democracy. Corruption is used to gain access to power and 
resources. In more democratic societies, the formal institutions of democracy – 
including both the political rights of free elections and the civil liberties of non-
discrimination, equality before the law and a free press – enable more open competition 
for such resources. This should also increase the legitimacy of decisions regarding the 
distribution of resources. Both the wider access to opportunities to gain resources and 
the legitimacy of their distribution will reduce the attraction and effectiveness of 
corruption. Democracy may also affect the ability of officials to engage in corruption. It 
makes them more accountable and their actions more transparent.  Governing elites 
that have the strength to impose decisions and control resources without challenge may 
use this capacity to extract resources for themselves (Karstedt, 2014). They may do so 
by supporting “extractive institutions:” institutional arrangements (including 
undemocratic forms of government, monopolistic or oligopolistic economies and 
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nepotism) that exclude their populations from access to resources (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). A higher level of democracy supports the development of “inclusive 
institutions” (e.g., open markets, democratic governance, meritocracy and the rule of 
law) which enable more of the population to develop their living standards (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012). The institutions of democracy will influence both the ability of 
governments to engage in corruption and the ability of their populations to take action 
against it.  
 
The new institutionalist framework suggests that it is not just formal institutions but 
also culturally shared value orientations that affect human behavior (Karstedt, 2010, 
2011b, 2015a; North, 1990; Van Deth, 1995). We do not act solely on the basis of 
instrumentally rational, self-interested calculation, as suggested by the rational choice 
theory adopted by some economic institutionalist analysts of corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 2010). Our choices are influenced by the normative dispositions which we 
learn from our societies. This means that the values that prevail in a given society will 
form part of the configurations that affect society’s levels of a variety of outcomes, 
including economic prosperity, security, homicide and corruption (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012; Bussmann, 2015; Karstedt, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2015a; Van Deth, 1995; 
Yeganeh, 2014).  
 
The World Values Survey (WVS) identifies two distinct value orientations that are both 
variable between countries and theoretically relevant for the study of corruption 
(Inglehart, 1997). These value orientations are closely linked with both socio-economic 
conditions and processes of democratization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Yeganeh 
(2014) found that both were associated with national levels of perceived corruption. 1 
They are the traditional/secular-rational and the survival/self-expression orientations. 
The traditional/secular-rational orientation concerns how people relate to traditional 
forms of authority (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). People at the traditional pole of this 
orientation are more accepting of traditional, hierarchical forms of authority. Those 
adhering to the secular-rational pole tend to be more challenging of arbitrary authority. 
They expect decisions to be rationally justified. This orientation may be linked with 
corruption, as it implies that the populations of some countries are more likely to defer 
to demands from people who occupy superior positions in the social hierarchy, whether 
or not such demands are rationally or democratically justified. 
 
The second principal orientation in the WVS is survival/self-expression. The survival 
pole of this orientation occurs as “people in societies shaped by existential insecurity 
and rigid intellectual and social constraints on human autonomy tend to emphasize 
economic and physical security above all” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 52). People with 
survival orientation are also more likely to distrust out-group members, are less likely 
to see themselves as interdependent with a wider group of peers and have lower levels 
of generalized trust. The self-expression pole of this orientation “taps a syndrome of 
tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, civic activism, and self-expression” 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 52). It is linked with higher levels of generalized trust. 
Other studies suggest that higher levels of generalized trust are associated with lower 
levels of perceived corruption (Graeff, 2005; Uslaner, 2006). The importance of self-
expression and social interdependence are also emphasized by the “modernization 
perspective” in new institutionalist criminology (LaFree et al., 2015). In a similar way to 
Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) “modernization theory,” this draws inspiration from 
Durkheim’s ideas on social transformation. As traditional societies develop into 
modernity, established values are challenged, leading to social disorganization and 
anomie, which increase the rates of some crimes. But as these societies become 
increasingly sophisticated, higher levels of social interdependence produce new forms 
of informal social control. This includes increased trust of out-groups and less reliance 
on in-groups. This should usually reduce corruption; with increased levels of 
generalized trust, people rely more on impartial, open procedures for the distribution of 
resources than on closed networks of families, friendships and favors.  Self-expression 
value orientations are also conducive to people using democratic institutions to 
challenge and reduce corruption. 
 
Importantly, these value orientations do not merely reflect individual characteristics 
and preferences. Rather, they tend to vary systematically between countries (Inglehart 
& Welzel, 2005). The socially embedded actions of individuals in these countries will be 
influenced by these commonly held value orientations. Some orientations may be more 
conducive to a higher national level of corruption than others. In keeping with the 
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“modernization perspective” (LaFree et al., 2015), corruption is theoretically expected 
to be higher in counties where the population tends to ascribe to the traditional and 
survival poles of these orientations, compared to those at the other poles: secular-
rational and self-expression orientations. However, the effect of value orientations is 
unlikely to be independent or universal. Under some circumstances, it may even be the 
case that traditional or survival orientations combine with other conditions to reduce, 
rather than increase, levels of corruption. For example, in particularly authoritarian 
countries where traditional leaders prohibit corruption, then a higher level of deference 
to traditional authority, as expressed in a greater level of traditional value orientation, 
may reduce levels of corruption. The effect of these value orientations on corruption 
will therefore be contingent upon the contexts in which they operate. 
  
Most previous studies, including those by Yeganeh (2014) and Treisman (2000), found 
that perceived corruption tends to be lower in countries with higher levels of human 
development (de Graaf et al., 2010). Others suggest that income inequality is also 
important (e.g., Akbar and Vujić, 2014; Uslaner, 2006; You and Khagram, 2005; Zhang et 
al., 2009). In highly developed countries which are both wealthy and well educated, 
there may be less widespread motivation to bend or break laws or procedures in order 
to access relatively scarce resources. A literate population may be more capable of 
scrutinizing and contesting corrupt actions, especially where formally democratic 
institutions enable them to do so. Income inequality is itself the product of institutional 
configurations (Tilly, 1998). It may increase the share of people living in poverty, who 
are particularly vulnerable to corrupt demands (Fried et al., 2010). It may also 
exacerbate the lack of open access to resources which may be caused by the absence of 
democratic, open, rationally justified formal institutions and the hierarchical, closed 
nature of social in-groups in countries with traditional and survival orientations.  
 
The new institutionalist approach highlights the interplay between formal institutions, 
value orientations and socio-economic contexts. Therefore, it is expected that effects on 
corruption will come from configurations of conditions. The existing literature on 
corruption does not usually test this expectation. Multivariate regression is the 
predominant analytical method in the studies referred to above among others (e.g., 
Dollar et al., 2001; Maeda and Ziegfeld, 2015; Mazar and Aggarwal, 2011; Musila, 2013; 
Park, 2003; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; Swamy et al., 2001). 
Regression analysis attempts to isolate the independent, additive effect of each 
predictor variable on the response variable. The new institutionalist framework 
suggests, in contrast, that causal effects will be configurational rather than independent 
and combinatorial rather than additive. The effect of any particular condition on an 
outcome will be contingent on the presence or absence of other relevant conditions. 
And there may be more than one “causal pathway” to the same outcome (Byrne, 2011; 
Ragin, 1994). Regression analysis can use interaction terms to examine combined 
effects, but previous studies of perceived corruption rarely test interactions. Regression 
analysis is also limited since it identifies only one causal pathway, in the form of a single 
regression equation. It is not well suited, therefore, to the analysis of complex, multiple 
causation. In her development of new institutionalist criminology, Karstedt moved from 
using multivariate regression (Karstedt, 2000), through bivariate analysis within sub-
groups of countries (Karstedt, 2011a, 2011b, 2014), to an explicitly configurational 
form of comparative analysis which “transcend[s] the particular, local, exceptional and 
idiosyncratic, but do[es] not make it invisible in sweeping macro-level analyses” 
(Karstedt, 2015b: 377). 
 
Therefore, this article uses QCA rather than regression to analyze the application of a 
new institutionalist framework to the available data. QCA is a configurational approach 
that examines set relations between cases, rather than correlations between variables 
(Ragin, 2000). Cases are described in terms of their degree of membership in the set of 
cases that have a specified condition. QCA then identifies whether specified 
configurations of conditions (including conditions that are linked by the Boolean 
operators, AND and OR) can be considered as being consistently necessary or sufficient 
for a specified outcome to occur. 
 
This article uses the fuzzy set variant of the QCA approach (fsQCA, Ragin, 2000, 2008). 
Cases’ membership in a fuzzy set can be anywhere in the range from a score of 0 (fully 
out of the set) to 1 (fully in the set). The principle of “set negation” can also be used to 
calculate scores for the opposite pole of each condition (e.g., its degree of membership 
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in the set of cases that have a low rather than a high level for that condition) by 
subtracting its score for that condition from 1. Raw data on cases can be calibrated into 
fuzzy set scores for the conditions that the cases have, including the outcomes and the 
potential causes. Fuzzy set scores can then be calculated for cases’ membership of 
configurations of conditions. A case’s score for a configuration of conditions that are 
linked by AND is the case’s lowest score for any of the conditions in the configuration. 
Its score for a configuration of conditions that are linked by OR is the highest of its set 
scores for any of these conditions. So if a case has a fuzzy set score for the condition of 
democracy of 1 and a score for human development of 0.4, its score for the 
configuration of democracy AND human development would be 0.4 (the minimum of 
the two scores). Its score for the configuration of democracy OR human development 
would be 1 (the maximum of the two scores). Its scores for the negation of the set of 
human development (in this article, this would indicate a low level of development) 
would be 0.6 (1 minus 0.4). 
 
Each case in the sample can be given a fuzzy set score for the outcome condition, for 
each potentially causal condition, for the opposites (set negations) of these conditions, 
and for each logically possible configuration of these potentially causal conditions. This 
enables us to test whether there is a relationship of necessity or sufficiency between a 
potentially causal condition (or configuration of conditions) and the outcome in a 
sample of cases. This is done in fsQCA software by comparing the fuzzy set scores of 
each of the cases for the conditions/configurations against their score for the outcome 
condition. If the cases’ scores for a condition/configuration are consistently equal to or 
higher than their scores for the outcome, then this suggests a relationship of necessity; 
the outcome only occurs in cases if the condition/configuration is present. The 
condition/configuration may also be present in cases that do not have the outcome, if 
the condition/configuration is not a sufficient cause of the outcome.  
 
If the cases’ scores for a condition/configuration are consistently equal to or lower than 
their scores for the outcome, then this suggests a relationship of sufficiency; the 
outcome always occurs in cases if the condition/configuration is present. The outcome 
may also be present in cases that do not have this condition or configuration, if the 
condition/configuration is not a necessary cause of the outcome.  
 
If cases’ scores for a condition/configuration are consistently equal to their score for the 
outcome, then this suggests that the condition/configuration is both necessary and 
sufficient for the outcome to occur. If there is no consistent relationship between cases’ 
scores for a condition/configuration and their scores for the outcome, then this suggests 
that this condition or configuration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of the 
outcome.  
 
The fsQCA process can identify more than one condition/configuration that is necessary 
or sufficient to cause an outcome, in line with the assumption that there may be 
multiple causal pathways to the same outcome. See Ragin (2008) for a full explanation 




The outcome of interest for this article is perceived levels of corruption at the national 
level. Corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International, 2015). This is a broad definition that includes both petty 
forms of corruption, such as the taking of bribes by low level officials, and grand 
corruption, such as the trade in influence at high levels of government. Data on levels of 
perceived corruption are available from Transparency International’s CPI for 2014. The 
CPI is collated from a variety of surveys of business executives and experts both outside 
and inside the 174 countries that it covers. There is no direct measure of corruption 
itself, but there is a strong correlation between the CPI and different indicators of 
national levels of corruption, including the International Crime Victimization Survey 
(Lambsdorff, 2007) and others (e.g., Barr and Serra, 2010; DeBacker et al., 2015; 
Escresa and Picci, 2014; Fisman and Miguel, 2007). The score given in the CPI is higher 
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for low levels of perceived corruption. This article follows others (e.g., De Backer et al., 
2015; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003) in reversing this score so that high scores indicate 
high levels of perceived corruption. 
 
Conditions included in potentially causal configurations in the analysis presented here 
were selected on theoretical grounds. Measures of democracy were taken from the 
Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2015). This uses a wide range of sources to provide a 
score (called “Polity”) for the level of democracy in 167 countries. This score ranges 
from minus ten to ten. Marshall et al. categorized countries with a Polity score above 
five as “democracies.” They categorized countries with scores between five and minus 
five as “anocracies,” and countries with scores below minus five as “autocracies.” 
 
Data on national value orientations were taken from the World Values Survey (WVS, 
2015). The WVS is a cross-national survey of values held by the populations of 90 
countries. It repeatedly surveys a random sample of over 1,000 people in each country, 
using a standardized questionnaire. The data used here were taken from the factorial 
variables that measure the underlying value orientations of traditional/rational-secular 
and survival/self-expression that are discussed above. These are each calculated from 
factor analysis of five individual items in the WVS, although they capture variation 
across a much wider range of questions (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). A score for these 
orientations was calculated for each country by taking the average of all the individual 
respondents’ scores in each country, including respondents from all the WVS waves 
between 1981 and 2014 (as enlarging the sample size for each country increases the 
accuracy of the estimates). National average value orientations are relatively stable over 
time, in that variation between countries is much larger than variation within countries 
over time (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Of course, the national average does not mean 
that every individual in the country has these orientations; rather it gives a 
measurement of the general tendency for orientations in each country. It is the effect of 
these commonly held orientations at the level of countries – rather than individuals – 
that is of interest in this article. 
 
Data on human development were retrieved from the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI) for 2014 (UNDP, 2015). The HDI is a composite index 
calculated from measurements of a country’s national income (gross domestic product 
per head), life expectancy and levels of education. It indicates the extent to which 
essential human needs are likely to be satisfied in the country, while also reflecting – 
through its inclusion of measures of education – the capacity of the population to 
become aware of, and thus to take action against, corruption.  The HDI dataset also 
includes separate measures of income inequality, including both the Atkinson measure 
and the Gini coefficient.2 The Atkinson measure was chosen for this analysis because it 
provides a better measure than the Gini coefficient of inequality among people at the 
lower end of the income scale, and it is available for more countries.   
 
All countries are prone to corruption. Even those that have a reputation for very low 
corruption have some experience of it (Crouch, 2015; Mulcahy, 2012). The aim of this 
study is to help answer the question of why some countries have high levels of 
corruption, and some have low levels. It is therefore important to include countries in 
the sample that have both low and high levels of perceived corruption, as measured by 
the CPI. As the causes of corruption may be different in highly developed countries 
compared to less developed countries, it is also important to include an indicator of 
development in the analysis. An advantage of QCA is that it enables the identification of 
different causal pathways at different levels of one of the conditions that it examines. It 
can suggest whether different configurations cause levels of perceived corruption in 
countries with high compared to low levels of human development.  
 
It is also useful to maximize the number of the logically possible configurations of the 
conditions that are actually present in cases in the sample. This number will tend to 
increase with sample size. Therefore, the sample included all the countries for which 
complete data were available. As previous studies found, data were not available for all 
the conditions of interest in every country. There were 77 countries for which data 
were available from all the sources listed above. This is a larger sample than for many 
fsQCA studies, but Ragin (2000) suggests that medium-sized samples are appropriate in 
“diversity-oriented” QCA, as shown in other articles (e.g., Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2014; 




The main limit to the available sample was that there are many – often relatively small 
and less developed – countries which are not covered by the World Values Survey. Only 
a minority of countries in the African region (9 out of 46), Middle East (including North 
Africa, 7/19), Asia Pacific (11/28), and the Americas (14/31) were present in the 
sample for analysis. A majority of Eastern European (including Central Asia, 14/19) and 
European Union (including European Free Trade Area, 22/31) countries were in the 
sample.3 Data on either income inequality or value orientations were not available for 
any of the Arab states of the Gulf. 
Data calibration 
 
Fuzzy set calibration and analysis of the data were carried out using the QCA package in 
the R statistical software environment (Duşa and Thiem, 2014). Calibration enables the 
cases to be assigned fuzzy set scores based on whether they are considered to have 
qualitatively high or low levels of each condition. The “direct method” for calibration 
transforms the value of the raw data into a fuzzy set score for each condition (Ragin, 
2008: 86). This process involves a calculation of the log odds that a case is a member of 
a specified set, based on the researcher’s specification of three thresholds: the values of 
the raw data that indicate full membership of the set, full exclusion from the set, and the 
crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is in or out of the set of 
cases with that condition. Using the raw data, a case that has a value that is higher than 
that chosen as the threshold for full inclusion would have a fuzzy set score of 1 for that 
condition. A case with a value that is just below this threshold would have a fuzzy set 
score just below 1. A case with a value that is below the chosen threshold for full 
exclusion from the set would have a fuzzy set score of 0. A case with a value that is near 
the chosen crossover point of maximum ambiguity would have a fuzzy set score near 
0.5. 
 
The three thresholds for calibration of each condition were determined by inspecting 
the distribution of the raw data across all the cases for which data were available. These 
distributions were compared to existing knowledge on qualitative differences in these 
conditions. Inspecting the data for all available countries (not just the 77 countries 
which had complete data) enabled better-informed judgments on which quantitative 
thresholds represent qualitative differences between cases; using a larger sample to 
make these judgments reduces the likelihood of error in identifying these thresholds 
(Krogslund et al., 2014). Information on the raw data (including the minimum, 
maximum and median values of the data distribution) and on the sample size (n) of the 
countries for which data were available for each condition is given in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The conditions were calibrated so that fuzzy set scores above 0.5 can be interpreted as a 
relatively high level of the condition. Fuzzy set scores below 0.5 can be interpreted as a 
relatively low level of that condition. It should be noted that a fuzzy set score of less 
than 0.5 for the rational-secular condition indicates that a country is relatively close to 
the traditional pole of this orientation. Similarly, a low set score for the self-expression 
condition would indicate that it is relatively close to the survival pole of this orientation. 
 
Calibration of the Polity IV Project data on democracy was guided by the project’s 
thresholds for classifying countries in order to create a set for ‘high democracy.’ 
Countries with the highest possible level of democracy (polity score = 10) were 
calibrated as a full member of this set (with a fuzzy set score of 1). Other “democracies” 
(i.e., countries with polity scores between 6 and 9) were calibrated as more in than out 
of this set (a fuzzy set score between 0.5 and 1). “Anocracies” with polity scores 
between one and five were calibrated as more out than in this set (a fuzzy set score 
between 0 and 0.5). Anocracies with polity scores between zero and minus five and 
“autocracies” (polity<-5) were calibrated as fully out of this set (a fuzzy set score of 0).  
 
This choice for thresholds was informed by preliminary analysis which suggested that it 
is particularly high levels of democracy that seem to make a difference for perceived 
corruption. Different calibrations were also tried for the democracy condition in 
preliminary analysis, in line with previous studies that suggest different relationships 
between democracy and perceived corruption. This included a calibration that placed 
all countries with a polity score above five as full members of the set of democratic 
countries. It also included a calibration for “medium” democracy, which calibrated 
countries with a polity score between zero and five as full members of the set of 
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medium democracy. However, these preliminary analyses did not produce superior 
explanations to those reported below.  
 
For the set of countries that have high human development, the full inclusion threshold 
(fuzzy set score = 1) was taken from the threshold used by UNDP (2015) to classify 
countries in the very high development categories of the HDI country list. Countries 
classified by the UN as low development groups were calibrated as fully out of the set of 
high development (score = 0). The crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to 
inclusion or exclusion from this set (score = 0.5) was set near the mid-point of the range 
of the HDI. 
 
For the calibration of democracy and human development, qualitative thresholds were 
available from the data sources themselves. These were not available in the data 
sources for income inequality or the two value orientations, or for the outcome of 
perceived corruption. The calibration of these conditions relied on the everyday, 
relative meanings of “high” and “low.” Therefore, the procedure for calibration of fuzzy 
set scores for these conditions was to examine the distribution of the data. A break 
point in the distribution (a value with no or few observations) that was near the median 
was chosen as the point of maximum ambiguity (fuzzy set score = 0.5). The threshold 
for full set inclusion (score = 1) and exclusion (score = 0) were set at break points near a 
value that would place approximately 20% of the countries above or below these 
thresholds at each end of the distribution.  
 
The chosen calibration thresholds are shown in Table 2. From left to right, this table 
displays: the name of the condition; the threshold value of the raw data below which 
cases were calibrated as fully excluded from the set of countries with a high level of that 
condition (fuzzy set score = 0); the crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to 
whether a case is or is not a member of that set (score = 0.5); and the threshold value 
above which cases were calibrated as being full members of that set (score = 1). The 
calibrated dataset, showing the fuzzy set scores for each condition for each country in 
the sample, is provide in Appendix 1. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Results 
Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
 
The calibrated data were analyzed following the process suggested by Thiem and Duşa 
(2013), with separate analyses for each of the two different outcomes: low and high 
levels of perceived corruption. The first step in each of these analyses was to identify 
whether there were conditions that were consistent with being necessary to cause the 
outcome. No individual conditions were found to be necessary for either high or low 
levels of perceived corruption.  
 
Comparison of cases in truth tables 
 
The next step was to identify those conditions or configurations that were consistent 
with being sufficient to cause the outcomes of either high or low perceived corruption. 
This step began with the construction of two truth tables: one for the outcome of high 
perceived corruption, the other for the outcome of low perceived corruption. These 
truth tables are combined in Table 3. This table includes a row for each of the 
configurations of conditions that were present in the cases in the sample. In the 
columns for the conditions, a 0 means that the configuration in that row included a 
relatively low level (fuzzy set score < 0.5) for the condition. A 1 means that the 
configuration in that row included a relatively high level (fuzzy set score > 0.5) for the 
condition in that column. For example, the configuration in row 20 of Table 3 includes 
high democracy AND rational-secular orientation AND self-expression orientation AND 
high human development AND low income inequality.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 also displays the extent to which each configuration is consistent with being 
sufficient to cause each outcome (i.e., the configuration’s score for consistency4). In 
order to distinguish which configurations are considered to be consistently sufficient 
for the outcome, a threshold for the value of the consistency score was chosen. Ragin 
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(2008) recommended choosing a break point that marks a qualitative difference 
between configurations high in the range of consistency scores. Thiem and Duşa (2013) 
recommended that this threshold should be set to at least 0.9. Configurations that 
exceeded this consistency threshold for the outcome of high perceived corruption are 
shown in bold text in Table 3. Configurations that exceeded the consistency threshold 
for the outcome of low perceived corruption are shown in italics5. Each row also 
includes a list of the countries that had fuzzy set scores above 0.5 for that configuration: 
a score which meant that the country was more in than out of the fuzzy set of countries 
that had that configuration.  
 
With five conditions, there were 32 logically possible configurations. Table 3 shows that 
20 of these configurations were actually present in cases in the sample. The rows in the 
table are numbered for ease of reference in the discussion below.  
 
Intermediate solutions of the truth table 
 
The fsQCA software uses Boolean minimization to simplify the expression of those 
configurations that are considered to be consistent with being sufficient for the 
outcomes. This process compares all the configurations that are considered to be 
consistently sufficient for the outcome. It eliminates any conditions that are logically 
redundant, i.e., those conditions that are at both high and low levels in otherwise 
identical consistent configurations. Using just the 20 configurations that were actually 
present in the sampled countries produces the “complex solution.” The “parsimonious 
solution” is produced by the incorporation in Boolean minimization of “logical 
remainder” configurations. These are logically possible configurations that have no 
actual cases due to limited diversity in the social world being studied (Ragin, 2000). For 
the parsimonious solution, these logical remainder configurations are treated as if they 
could affect the outcome either way, depending on which way produces the least 
complex configuration. For the “intermediate solution,” logical remainder 
configurations are treated as if they would affect the outcome as they would be 
expected to on the basis of previous empirical research (thus enabling the use of 
previously generated knowledge in the analysis). In line with the suggestion of 
Schneider and Wagemann (2010), the full formulas for the complex, parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions for each of the two fsQCA analyses are displayed in Appendices 2 
and 3.  
 
In the interpretation of fsQCA, the intermediate solutions are the most likely to provide 
valid information for the potential causes of the outcome (Ragin, 2008). The 
intermediate solutions are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. These tables follow the QCA 
convention of using capitals for conditions that are present at a high level in a 
configuration and lower case to indicate a low level of the condition. In addition to the 
score for the consistency of the intermediate solution, these tables also display the score 
for its coverage.6 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The intermediate solution in Table 4 suggests that the causes of low perceived 
corruption are indeed configurational. It shows that two configurations – each 
containing four of the five potentially causal conditions included in the analysis – are 
consistent with usually being sufficient to cause low levels of perceived corruption. As 
expected by the new institutionalist framework, it is the combinations of high 
democracy, rational-secular orientations, self-expression orientations, high human 
development and low income inequality that appear to be sufficient to cause low 
perceived corruption in countries in this sample.  
 
None of the individual conditions seem to be sufficient on their own to cause low 
perceived corruption. Table 3 shows that there are configurations and countries that 
have at least one of these conditions but do not consistently have low levels of perceived 
corruption (see rows 13 to 16 of Table 3). Indeed, there are several configurations that 
include one or more of these conditions but have consistently high levels of perceived 
corruption (rows 1 to 11 of Table 3). For example, countries that have relatively high 
levels of democracy but also have relatively high levels of perceived corruption include 
Moldova, Indonesia, Pakistan, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, the Philippines, India, 




Insert Table 5 about here  
 
The intermediate solution in Table 5 suggests that four configurations – each containing 
either low democracy or low human development – are usually sufficient to cause high 
perceived corruption. These are the configurations of: low human development AND 
low rational-secular orientation; OR low human development AND low self-expression 
orientation; OR low democracy AND low self-expression orientation; OR low democracy 
AND low rational-secular orientation AND high income inequality. Table 3 shows that 
there are no configurations of low democracy or low human development that have 
consistently high perceived corruption without also having at least one of either low 
self-expression or low rational-secular value orientations. Several consistently sufficient 
configurations have both traditional and survival value orientations (see rows 4, 5, 10, 
11 and 12 of Table 3). However, when traditional and survival orientations are present 
in cases that have both high democracy and high human development (see rows 13 to 
18 of Table 3), these configurations are not consistently sufficient for the outcome of 
high perceived corruption. Therefore, the intermediate solution in Table 5 suggests a 
key but contingent role for these two value orientations in producing high levels of 
perceived corruption.   
 
QCA can be sensitive to the specification of the analysis, and especially to the calibration 
of the crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to cases’ membership of the sets for 
the conditions (i.e., the point in the raw data where the fuzzy set score would be 0.5; 
Krogslund et al., 2014). This sensitivity may be greater when this point is calibrated 
near the median of the raw data (Hino, 2009). Tests for the robustness of the analysis 
were therefore carried out. These used both the 45th percentile and the 55th percentile 
of the raw data as the crossover point in new calibrations of each condition in 48 new 
analyses of necessity and sufficiency. The results presented above were robust to these 
different specifications.  
 
Overall, the fsQCA analysis provides strong empirical support for the new 
institutionalist theoretical framework in explaining the occurrence of perceived 
corruption across the countries included in this analysis. Several previous studies tried 
to identify the independent effect of individual variables on corruption. The current 
analysis suggests that such approaches may miss the configurational nature of the 
causes of corruption. The effects identified in this analysis are not independent but 
contingent on the level of other conditions. This may, for example, be why Treisman’s 
(2000) regression analysis did not find a significant association between contemporary 
levels of democracy and perceived corruption. 
Discussion 
Application of fsQCA findings to cases 
 
The current analysis helps us to explain differences in perceived corruption between 
some countries and types of countries, but highlights others for further analysis. For 
example, we can look at countries that Inglehart and Welzel (2015) placed in the “Latin 
American” category of their “cultural map.” If we wish to understand why it is that 
Uruguay has lower levels of perceived corruption than other Latin American countries, 
then the fsQCA highlight the potential impact of high rational-secular orientation, 
relative to the more traditional orientation of the Latin American democracies that 
appear in row 16 of Table 3 (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru), as well as higher 
human development than Guatemala (row 4) and higher levels of democracy than 
Ecuador and Venezuela (row 1). However, this does not help to explain why Brazil and, 
in particular, Chile (both in row 16) have relatively low levels of perceived corruption. 
These cases and others may require more detailed, sole case studies to identify more 
case-specific explanations of their levels of perceived corruption (Karstedt, 2001).  The 
fact that there are countries whose levels of perceived corruption are not explained by 
the intermediate solutions produced above is in line with QCA’s expectation that there 
are multiple causal pathways to the same outcome. Some of them may not be captured 
by a particular analysis (Ragin, 2000). 
 
For Africa, the contingency of the effect of democracy on value orientations may help to 
explain why progress in achieving low levels of perceived corruption is slower than the 
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process of democratization (Musila, 2013). In the WVS data, African countries do not 
have the relatively high rational-secular or self-expression orientations on which the 
effect of democracy on perceived corruption appears to depend.  
 
Another geographical pattern that emerges from the analysis is that most of the 
countries that were once members of the Soviet Bloc but were not part of the USSR itself 
now have low levels of perceived corruption, while countries formed out of the break-
up of the USSR (except the Baltic states) have high levels of perceived corruption. A full 
explanation of this pattern requires more detailed analysis of how these countries have 
dealt with the legacy of the Soviet era (e.g., Karstedt, 2003, 2014; Kupatadze, 2015; 
Levay, 2013; Scheinost, 2014). But such studies can be informed by the suggestion from 
this analysis that the explanation may include the combination of high democracy and 
high human development with high self-expression orientation, which is absent in many 
of the former (or current) communist countries that have high levels of perceived 
corruption.  
 
The Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, along with several other post-communist 
counties, display a configuration that is not consistently sufficient for either high or low 
perceived corruption. But Latvia and Estonia have relatively low levels of perceived 
corruption. Thus, it would be interesting to study what other conditions may help to 
explain this difference between them and some other post-communist states which 
share their configuration (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro). The 
relative lack of conflict in the Baltic compared to the Western Balkan region could be 
highlighted for examination. This line of inquiry could also be applied – for a different 
region of warfare – to the anomalous case of Lebanon. It could build on the idea that 
violent conflict leaves populations more vulnerable to predation by powerful groups 
who capture the state (Tilly, 1985). 
 
Another interesting place to look for explanation of the differences between countries 
that are not explained by the configurations identified here is the relative success of the 
regimes and policies adopted for the control of corruption. Countries with similar 
configurations of the conditions included in this analysis may have governments who 
place a different level of priority on tackling corruption. For example, Latvia is only just 
in the set of countries with low perceived corruption, while Estonia is a full member of 
this set. This difference may be explained partly by differences in the particular 
economic institutions and policy approaches taken to reduce corruption in these 
countries (Urdze, 2012). Hollyer and Wantchekon (2015) suggest that autocratic 
governments may prioritize anti-corruption efforts primarily when their base of 
political support is narrow and their own supporters are motivated by ideology, rather 
than financial reward. Anti-corruption efforts then enable the regime to avoid allowing 
opponents into positions of power. Hollyer and Wantchekon gave the examples of the 
Kagame regime in Rwanda, and South Korea under the autocratic rule of Park Chung-
Hee.  
 
Georgia is another country for which a case-specific explanation may be needed. 
Detailed case analysis suggests that the relative success of Georgia’s anti-corruption 
efforts depended on their “resonance … with local cultural norms” (Börzel and van 
Hüllen, 2014: 625), as indicated by a high level of public protest against corruption. 
Such anomalous cases show the complexity of the interplay between the conditions 
identified in this analysis and other potential causes; “given elites, institutions and 
situation-specific factors play crucial roles” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 42). The 
operation of the configurations identified here will itself be contingent on the specific 
circumstances of each country. Nevertheless, the intermediate solutions in Tables 4 and 
5 do cover reasonably high proportions of the occurrence of the outcomes of low and 
high levels of perceived corruption. Therefore, they may help us move towards a 




The preceding paragraphs show how examination of the fuzzy set truth table alongside 
their intermediate solutions can provide interesting insights and avenues for further 
research. As fsQCA is a case-oriented method, these can be directly applied to particular 
countries or types of countries. But fsQCA also has its limitations. Some of these are 
shared with the mainstream, regression approaches used in this field, such as the 
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possibilities of measurement error, ambiguity over causation, sampling bias and 
sensitivity to omitted condition/variable bias. 
 
The generalizability of any study is reduced if it omits cases which differ systematically 
from those that are included in the sample. For this study, this is the case for the Arab 
states of the Gulf. They tend to have very low levels of democracy, but also have 
relatively low levels of perceived corruption in the CPI. They do not appear in the 
sample for the fsQCA analysis because there were missing values for value orientations 
or income inequality. It is unlikely that they share the value orientations that are 
present in the countries with low levels of perceived corruption that are included in the 
analysis; Islamic countries tend to have relatively low levels of rational-secular and self-
expression orientations (Inglehart and Welzel, 2015). This suggests that these countries 
may follow a causal pathway to low perceived corruption that is not identified in this 
analysis. Previous regression studies of the links between corruption, democracy and 
value orientations obscure the occurrence of low levels of perceived corruption in the 
autocratic Arab states of the Gulf, since they discuss variables rather than cases (e.g., La 
Porta et al., 1999; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; Treisman, 2000; Yeganeh, 2014). Another 
important missing case for further exploration, since it has a low level of perceived 
corruption with relatively low levels of democracy, is Singapore. If these countries were 
included, it would strengthen the possibility of finding that low levels of democracy 
(compared to medium levels) can be part of configurations with low perceived 
corruption, in combination with traditional and survival values.  
 
QCA analysis shows which configurations are empirically consistent with being 
necessary or sufficient to cause the outcome. This does not prove that they are causes of 
the outcome. The possibility of spurious conjunction of configurations and outcomes 
remains. This and the cross-sectional nature of the analysis are reasons why this article 
does not claim that it definitively demonstrates the causes of perceived corruption. The 
possibility of reverse causation also persists. Indeed, it is likely that high corruption 
forms part of the configurations of conditions that impede reductions in inequality, and 
hinder increases in human development and democracy and thus the transition towards 
self-expression and rational-secular orientations. Previous work suggests that 
perceived corruption does tend to reduce economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 
2000), increase inequality (Uslaner, 2006) and damage the institutions of democracy 
(UNODC, 2012). Supplementary analysis was carried out to test whether levels of 
perceived corruption are present in configurations that are consistent with being 
sufficient to cause levels of democracy. This was the case for the outcome of high 
democracy, but not for lower levels.7 This suggestion of reverse, contingent causation of 
high democracy by low perceived corruption does not rule out that the configurations 
identified in this article are causes of perceived corruption. Rather, it emphasizes the 
importance of thinking about corruption in terms of mutually reinforcing configurations 
of conditions, instead of unidirectional, independent effects. This process of cyclical 
reinforcement of the conditions of corruption was observed in detail, for example, in the 
case of Nigeria (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011). 
 
Other studies use a wider range of variables than the conditions analyzed in this article, 
including gender inequality (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001), ethnic diversity 
(e.g., Musila, 2013; Treisman, 2000; Uslaner, 2006) and – as a measure of international 
integration – openness to trade (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Treisman, 2000; Uslaner, 
2006). The conditions chosen for this analysis were those considered to be most 
relevant to the new institutionalist theoretical framework. Supplementary analyses 
were carried out which added conditions for gender inequality (calibrated from raw 
data from the UN Human Development Report), ethnic fractionalization (calibrated 
from data provided in the Quality of Governance dataset; Kumlin et al., 2015), or 
openness to trade (calibrated from data provided by the World Bank on the proportion 
of GDP that was made up of trade in 2013). Adding these conditions to the analysis did 
not provide more than minimal increases in either consistency or coverage compared to 
the analyses presented above. It did reduce the sample sizes and add to the complexity 
of the solutions. For low perceived corruption, the combination of high democracy, 
development and self-expression orientation always formed part of the consistently 
sufficient intermediate solutions. For high perceived corruption, consistently sufficient 
intermediate solutions always included low democracy or low human development (or 





This article empirically supports a new institutionalist explanation of diversity between 
countries in their levels of perceived corruption. Specifically, it demonstrates the 
configurational nature of this phenomenon through the novel application of the fsQCA 
approach. It suggests an explanation for why corruption seems to be so intractable. It 
emphasizes the role of values in causing corruption. Through examination of specific 
countries and regions, it suggests interesting geographical patterns in the causes of 
corruption. Furthermore, it provides suggestions for cases and conditions to include in 
further research. 
 
The fsQCA truth tables and their intermediate solutions provide empirical support for 
the new institutionalist expectations that the causation of perceived corruption is 
configurational. It involves the interplay of democratic institutions and value 
orientations with socio-economic contexts. The analyses presented here suggest that 
the search for independent effects on perceived corruption may be misleading. For 
example, increases in levels of democracy that are not accompanied by changes in value 
orientations and human development may not produce low levels of perceived 
corruption. This may help explain the mixed findings of previous studies on the 
influence of democracy, which have searched for its independent effect. 
 
These analyses may also help to explain the apparent intractability of corruption. This 
may be due to the difficulty and delay involved in changing all of the conditions that 
apparently combine in its causation. For example, in order to secure a low level of 
perceived corruption by creating the conditions that appear to be sufficient to cause this 
outcome, a country would need to reach a high level of at least four of the five 
conditions in this analysis (high democracy and human development and self-
expression orientation, along with either rational-secular orientation or low income 
inequality). This may be a lengthy process for countries that currently display several of 
the conditions at the poles that are supportive of high perceived corruption.  
 
Another contribution is the article’s confirmation of the presence of value orientations 
in configurations that may cause low or high perceived corruption. Many previous 
studies do not take such conditions into account. This article supports the few studies 
(e.g., Bussmann, 2015; Karstedt, 2004; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; Yeganeh, 2014) that 
highlight their importance. For high levels of perceived corruption, it seems that 
democracy or development usually combine with traditional or survival orientations in 
sufficient causal configurations. The combination of self-expression orientation with 
both high democracy and development seems particularly central to the explanation of 
low levels of perceived corruption, as it appears in both configurational elements of the 
intermediate solution for this outcome. 
 
Finally, this article identifies interesting patterns in the geographic distribution of levels 
of perceived corruption and highlights particular cases and concepts for further study. A 
provisional explanation – the relative absence of rational-secular and/or self-expression 
orientations – is offered for thinking about corruption in some countries that are 
categorized by Inglehart and Welzel (2015) as “African-Islamic” or “Latin American,” 
and why they may have achieved development and/or democracy but do not yet have 
low levels of perceived corruption. The anomalous cases of Lebanon and the countries 
of the Western Balkan region point towards the need for more detailed analysis of the 
configurational effect of conflict on levels of perceived corruption.  
 
In line with the assumptions of QCA, these inevitably provisional findings are not 
presented as the end of a line of inquiry, but rather as a contribution to its ongoing 
development. This article demonstrates that, in the pursuit of such knowledge, it will be 
useful to adopt a configurational, new institutionalist approach which considers the 
complex interplay of democratic institutions and value orientations with socio-
economic contexts to explore the causes of corruption. 
 
                                                          
1 Some other studies use Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions - including collectivism, power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance - as predictors of perceived corruption. In Yeganeh’s (2014) 
integrative analysis, the inclusion of these four dimensions in a regression model for perceived 
corruption produced a slightly higher value for adjusted R squared than a model with Inglehart’s (1997) 
two value orientations did, but with higher variance inflation factors and lower T values for the individual 
variables. The highest T ratios in these models were for Hofstede’s collectivism and Inglehart’s 
survival/self-expression. Inglehart and Welzek (2005) argued that both these variables tap into the same 
underlying dimension. Inglehart’s orientations also have the advantages of being more recently measured 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 The Gini coefficient measures the distance of the distribution of income in a country from perfect 
equality. It is particularly sensitive to differences around the mode in the income distribution. The 
Atkinson measure indicates the proportion of a country’s total income that would be required to produce 
an equal level of social welfare as at present if all income were distributed equally (De Maio, 2007). It 
includes a parameter that can be adjusted to reflect the level of aversion to inequality. As used in the UN 
Human Development Index, it is more sensitive than the Gini coefficient to inequality at the lower end of 
the income distribution. 
 
3 This allocation of countries to regions follows the categorization by Transparency International in the 
CPI report. 
 
4 The score for consistency measures the strength of the relationship between the potentially causal 
configuration and the outcome (Ragin 2008). Consistency ranges from 1 (perfect consistent) to 0 (no 
consistency). It is calculated by dividing the total of those parts of cases’ fuzzy set scores for the 
configuration that are equal to or less than their score for the outcome by the total of the cases’ scores for 
the configuration. If the value for consistency falls far below 1, then this suggests that a non-trivial 
proportion of the occurrence of the configuration has failed to cause the outcome in cases in the sample.  
 
5 The values for the proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) were calculated for each configuration, 
as well as the raw consistency values. There were large gaps in the ranges of PRI values around the 
conventional PRI cut-off threshold of 0.8. Using this cut-off threshold produced the same lists of 
configurations that were considered sufficient for the outcomes as are shown in bold and italic text in 
Table 3. 
 
6 The score for coverage measures the proportion of the occurrence of the outcome that may be explained 
by the presence of the sufficient configuration (Ragin, 2008). Coverage ranges from 1 (perfect coverage) 
to 0 (no coverage). It is calculated by dividing the total of the minima of all the cases’ scores for either the 
outcome or the sufficient configuration by the total of all cases’ fuzzy set scores for the outcome. If there 
are many cases for which the score for the outcome substantially exceeds their score for the 
configuration, then the score for coverage would be low. This would suggest that the configuration does 
not explain much of the occurrence of the outcome in sampled cases. 
 
7 Using the same conditions, raw data and calibrations as reported above, the intermediate, sufficient 
solution for the outcome of high democracy was: self-expression AND high human development AND low 
perceived corruption; OR rational-secular AND high human development AND low income inequality 
AND low perceived corruption; OR rational-secular AND self-expression AND high human development 
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